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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




In re: YOLANDA RADOGNA,
                                                                      Debtor
MICHAEL A. RADOGNA,
                                                                           Appellant
v.
WILLIAMS TOWNSHIP; WILLIAMS TOWNSHIP 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; SALLY HIXSON; ROBERT DOERR, 
FRED MEBUS; RICHARD ADAMS; BRIAN M.P. MONAHAN
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-04536)
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas M. Golden
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 18, 2009
Before:    BARRY, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges





Michael A. Radogna appeals pro se from an order of the District Court affirming
2the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of an adversary complaint.  We will affirm.
I.
Radogna’s mother, Yolanda Radogna, filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection
in 2001.  (Bankr. E.D. Pa. No. 01-24118.)  The Bankruptcy Court entered an order
confirming her Chapter 13 plan in 2002.  Radogna’s mother died in January 2007.  On
August 27, 2007, the Trustee filed his final report stating that the bankruptcy estate had
been fully administered and requesting an order of discharge.  The Bankruptcy Court
discharged the estate by order entered September 19, 2007.
On August 30—after the Trustee filed his final report, but before the Bankruptcy
Court discharged his mother’s estate—Radogna filed an adversary complaint against
Williams Township and certain of its employees.  (Bankr. E.D. Pa. No. 07-2078.) 
Radogna purported to file the complaint on his mother’s behalf under a power of attorney,
and also asserted claims personal to him.  According to Radogna, a Township zoning
officer “trespassed” on his property (which had belonged to his mother) and told him that
he required a grading permit, apparently for construction being done at the property. 
Thereafter, the Township issued to Radogna a “stop work” order and three citations for
zoning ordinance violations.  These events occurred in April 2007.  Radogna also alleges
that Township employees improperly responded to an informational request he made in
connection with these proceedings.  He claims that these actions violated the automatic
bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, and his own constitutional rights to privacy and due
    Before filing his complaint, Radogna filed a notice of removal purporting to remove1
the zoning citations to federal court.  A District Judge summarily remanded the matter,
see Commonwealth of Pa. v. Radogna, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 07-cv-03027, and Radogna filed
his complaint shortly thereafter.
    The District Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we2
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  The dismissal of
Radogna’s complaint technically was without prejudice because both the Bankruptcy
Court and District Court gave him leave to re-file it through counsel, but both courts’
orders effectively are final because Radogna has stood on his purported right to proceed
with the complaint pro se.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.3d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir.
1976).  “Our review of the District Court’s ruling in its capacity as an appellate court is
plenary, and we review the bankruptcy judge’s legal determinations de novo.”  In re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
3
process.1
By order entered September 24, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Radogna’s
complaint on the grounds that he was not authorized to represent his mother’s estate pro
se and gave him leave to re-file the complaint through legal counsel.  Radogna appealed
to the District Court, which affirmed on the same ground by order entered April 10, 2008. 
Radogna now appeals to us.2
II.
Radogna’s complaint alleges that defendants’ actions both violated the automatic
stay in his mother’s bankruptcy and violated his own constitutional rights.  The
Bankruptcy Court dismissed his entire complaint on the grounds that he was not
authorized to represent his mother pro se.  We agree with that ruling, and agree that it
    We note, without deciding the issue, that the Williams Township zoning citations may3
not have been subject to the automatic stay in the first place.  See In re Mystic Tank Lines
Corp., 544 F.3d 524, 526-27 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing “police and regulatory power”
exception to automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)).
    Both the Bankruptcy Court and District Court opined that Radogna was practicing or4
attempting to practice law without a license in violation of state law.  Radogna takes issue
with those statements and appears to argue that the District Court erred in failing
conclusively to resolve that issue.  That issue, however, was not before the Bankruptcy
Court or the District Court and is not before us.  Like the Bankruptcy Court and District
Court, we decide merely that Radogna’s power of attorney did not permit him to litigate
pro se on behalf of his mother in federal court as a matter of federal law.  The statements
below regarding the unauthorized practice of law were surplusage.
4
required the dismissal of the complaint insofar as it sought to enforce the automatic stay.3
Federal courts, including ours, “have routinely adhered to the general rule
prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative
capacity.”  Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting
cases).  See also Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that parent and guardian could not litigate pro se on behalf of his children). 
Radogna’s power of attorney may have conferred certain decision-making rights under
state law, but it does not allow him to litigate pro se on behalf of his mother in federal
court.  See Powerserve Int’l, Inc. v. Lavi, 239 F.3d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 2001).4
Radogna also lacked standing to enforce the automatic stay on his own behalf.  He
appears to argue, as he argued for the first time in the District Court, that he may assert a
violation of the automatic stay because he is a “co-debtor” with his mother.  But Radogna
was not a co-debtor in his mother’s bankruptcy.  The Chapter 13 petition bears her name
    The District Court believed that it was “not in a position to determine whether5
appellant is, in fact, a co-debtor, as doing so is beyond the scope of its authority as an
appellate court.”  (Dist. Ct. Op. n.1.)  Determining whether Radogna was a co-debtor in
his mother’s bankruptcy, however, entails nothing more than a review of the Bankruptcy
Court record and a determination of whether Radogna was a debtor in that proceeding. 
5
only, and she remained the only debtor in the Bankruptcy Court from the time she filed
her petition until the time her estate was discharged.  Nor does Radogna’s potential status
as a “co-debtor” with his mother in some other capacity (which he does not assert) confer
standing to enforce the automatic stay.  See In re New Era, Inc., 135 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he stay is for the protection of the debtor and its creditors.”); Winters v.
George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that the
automatic stay does not apply to non-bankrupt codebtors.”).  Accordingly, Radogna
lacked authority to enforce the automatic stay on behalf of his mother, and lacked
standing to enforce it on behalf of himself.5
This ruling does not dispose of Radogna’s own constitutional claims.  Neither the
Bankruptcy Court nor the District Court addressed those claims, but there is no reversible
error in that regard.  The Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over Radogna’s claim
regarding the automatic stay.  See Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 317 (3d
Cir. 2008) (Article III standing is a “jurisdictional prerequisite”).  Thus, Radogna’s
constitutional claims required an independent jurisdictional basis.  See also In re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 223 (“we adopted a claim-by-claim approach to determine the
extent of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction”).  They do not have one.
6Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims “arising under” Title 11
or “arising in” a Title 11 bankruptcy case (collectively, “core” claims), as well as those
“related to” a bankruptcy case.  Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2006).
Radogna’s constitutional claims fall within neither the Bankruptcy Court’s “core” or
“related to” jurisdiction.  Radogna’s claims are not core claims because it cannot be said
that “the Bankruptcy Code creates the cause of action or provides the substantive right
invoked” (and thus that they “arise under” Chapter 11), or that they “‘have no existence
outside the bankruptcy’” (and thus “arise in” the bankruptcy).  Stone, 436 F.3d at 216-17
(citation omitted).  To the contrary, Radogna’s claims allegedly arise under the
Constitution and are wholly independent of his mother’s bankruptcy.  
Neither are his claims “related to” that bankruptcy.  Claims are “related to” a
bankruptcy if their outcome “‘could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy.’”  Id. at 216 (citation omitted).  “[A]t the post-confirmation
stage, ‘the claim must affect an integral aspect of the bankruptcy process—there must be
a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or proceeding.’”  Id. at 216 n.3 (citation omitted). 
Radogna’s constitutional claims clearly do not qualify.  His claims seek redress for harm
allegedly done to him, and he seeks damages for his own alleged “serious mental anguish,
psychological and emotional distress, character assassination, and financial disdain.” 
(Compl. ¶ 24.)  These claims bear no conceivable relation to his mother’s bankruptcy,
which already had been fully administered when Radogna filed his complaint.  
    Radogna initially sought sanctions because he claimed that he did not receive a copy6
of appellees’ brief or their motion to file it out of time.  Appellees responded that they
sent both to Radogna, that their mailings were not returned as undeliverable, and that he
must have received a copy of their brief.  In his reply, Radogna does not dispute those
assertions and instead makes additional allegations that we find to be immaterial.  To the
extent that Radogna’s reply on the issue of sanctions might be construed also as a motion
to enlarge the record on appeal, that aspect of the motion is denied as well.
7
Accordingly, the District Court’s order will be affirmed.  Radogna’s motion for
sanctions is denied.6
